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THE TAMPA INCIDENT: IMO PERSPECTIVES AND
RESPONSES ON THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS
RESCUED AT SEA

Frederick J. Kenney, Jr.t
Vasilios Tasikast
Abstract:
The duty to provide aid to fellow seafarers in distress has long
been enshrined in maritime tradition. The modem formalization of this duty in
international law, however, has created a division between the duty to "provide
assistance" and the obligation to "rescue." This division has created ambiguity and
friction as the former duty applies to individuals and vessels whereas the latter obligation
applies to states. In recent years, incidents involving two commercial vessels, the Tampa
and the Castor,have starkly illustrated the extent to which this ambiguity and friction in
international law translates into negative effects in the real world.
In response to these two incidents, the International Maritime Organization
("IMO") has begun to act to address dilemmas raised. The IMO has concluded that there
is a true distinction between the duty to "assist" and the duty to "rescue." There is a valid
rationale to maintaining that distinction. The solution to the problems faced by mariners
in this area cannot and should not be solved by conflating the different requirements and
powers implicated by rescue versus assistance. Rather, the solution lies in the creation of
an obligation for coastal, port, and flag states to cooperate and coordinate solutions. This
Article recommends that the Maritime Safety Committee embrace the outcomes
developed at the informal meeting in Sweden in September 2002, which encompass the
concept of finding solutions through international cooperation and coordination.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two years, events involving the Tampa and the Castor

triggered uneasy and complex international dilemmas on the high seas. In
t
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Organization.
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August 2001, the Tampa, a Norwegian cargo vessel, was denied admission
to Australian waters in order to disembark the 4380 people it saved from a
sinking ferry in the Indian Ocean. In December 2000, the Castor, a Cypriot
oil tanker, was denied entry into territorial waters and ports of several
Mediterranean countries after it suffered severe structural hull damage

during a winter storm at sea.
Both the Tampa and the Castor were denied permission from coastal
authorities to enter territorial waters and ports. Each case highlights the
question of when, if ever, a ship, without prior governmental authorization,
may enter a coastal state's territorial waters and ports if the ship's captain
believes it necessary for the protection of the vessel, its cargo, or the safety
of those persons on board.1 Both incidents expose the friction and ambiguity
in international law regarding port entry in time of necessity when weighing
the rights of coastal states and those of commercial vessels. These legal
ambiguities compound and exacerbate

the lack of cooperation

and

coordination between the coastal, port, and flag states involved.
The Tampa and Castor incidents have been a catalyst for debate and
action at the International Maritime Organization ("IMO"). 2 With the

' In the maritime context, this concept is often described as force majeure. Force Majeure is a
principle of international maritime law that allows a vessel to enter the territorial sea or ports of a state
"when necessary for the safety of the vessel or persons on board." Edward Bonekemper III, Any Port in a
Storm, NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 1991, at 97. Force Majeure originated in French law
referring to "a superior force" and is defined as "[a]n event or effect that can neither be anticipated nor
controlled; includes both acts of nature (floods, hurricanes), and acts of people (riots, strikes, war); Act of
God." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (West 1996).
2 In 1948, the United Nations Maritime Conference met in Geneva, Switzerland
and adopted the
convention that founded the IMO.
KENNETH R. SIMMONDS, THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
ORGANIZATION 2-4 (1994). See also D.H.N. Johnson, IMCO: The FirstFour Years (1959-1962), 12 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 31 (1963). This Convention, originally entitled the Convention on the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization ("IMCO"), would take another ten years before it entered into force on
March 17, 1958. The IMCO's first organizational meeting as a newly constructed UN entity was held on
January 6, 1959. The original Convention called for the acceptance of "twenty-one States, of which seven
shall each have a total tonnage of not less than 1,000,000 gross tons of shipping" before the Convention
would enter into force. Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar.
17, 1958, art. 59, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 [hereinafter IMO Convention]. In
1982, the name officially changed to the "International Maritime Organization." Amendments to the 1MCO
Convention, IMO Assembly Res. A. 358(IX) (Nov. 14, 1975) (entered into forced May 22, 1982), reprinted
in 6A ERASTuS C. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 12-50 (M. Cohen rev. 7th ed. 1983) [hereinafter
Res. A. 358].
The IMO is a United Nation's Specialized Agency originally created to promote safety at sea.
SIMMONDS, supra note 2. The IMO's primary goal is to facilitate cooperation among maritime nations
regarding technical and safety aspects of shipping. Id. Its general purpose is defmed in Article 1(a) of the
IMO Convention:
to provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping
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Secretary-General's urging, the IMO has placed two topics, designated as
"Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea" and "Places of Refuge," high on the
Organization's agenda. This Article examines the two responsibilities
central to the Tampa incident: the duty to assist and the obligation to rescue.
It also discusses the IMO's response to the perceived lapses in these duties
and obligations that exacerbated the problems in both cases.
This Article argues that the appropriate solution to these problems is
placing new obligations on coastal and port states to coordinate and
cooperate in the resolution of these difficult situations. The authors further
posit that this obligation should be coupled with the creation of a

engaged in international trade; and to encourage the general adoption of the highest
practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, and efficiency of navigation.
IMO Convention, supra note 2, art. l(a).
In 1970, the IMO sphere of concern broadened to include the "the prevention and control of marine
pollution arising from exploration and exploration of the sea-bed and ocean floor." Y. Sasamura, 34 Years
of IMO, IMO NEWS, No. 4, 1993, at 17, 19. Today, the IMO continues its dual role of establishing
international standards for "safer shipping and protection of the marine environment." Bin Okamura,
Proposed IMO Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships, 26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 183
(1995).
Similar to other UN agencies, the IMO includes an Assembly, a Council, and a Secretariat. The IMO
also consists of four constitutional committees: the Maritime Safety Committee ("MSC"), Marine
Environment Protection Committee ("MEPC"), Legal Committee, and the Facilitation Committee.
The MSC, which includes of all member states, is the most senior committee. Its responsibilities
include all technical aspects of shipping, except those of marine pollution. Under the IMO Convention, the
MSC has the duty to:
Consider[ ] any matter within the scope of the Organization and concerned with aids to
navigation, construction and equipment of vessels, manning from safety standpoint, rules
for the prevention of collisions, handling of dangerous cargoes, maritime safety
procedures and requirements, hydrographic information, log-books and navigational
records, maritime casualty investigations, salvage and rescue and any other matter
directing affecting maritime safety.
IMO Convention, supra note 2, art. 29(a).
The MEPC was created in 1973. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
Nov. 2, 1973 (entered into force Oct. 2, 1983), attachment 3, Resolution 26 reprinted in IMO, MARPOL
73/78, Sales No. IMO-520E (2002) and 12 I.L.M. 1319. See also, Res. A. 358, supra note 2. Its realm of
responsibility is concerned with prevention and control of pollution from ships. Id. Nine specialized and
technical sub-committees, including the Sub-Committee on Radio-Communications and Search and Rescue
(COMSAR) and the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV), assist the MSC and MEPC in their
work. Id. The Legal Committee is granted the authority to handle any legal matters within the general
purpose of the Organization. Id. Finally, the Facilitation Committee has the primary mandate to simplify
formalities and governmental procedures to further international shipping. Amendments to the Convention
on the InternationalMaritimeAssociation, IMO Assembly Res. A.724(17) (Nov. 7, 1991) [hereinafter Res.
A. 724]. (The Facilitation Committee was originally created in 1972, however, it was not established as a
constitutional committee. Res. A.724 proposes amendments to the IMO Convention that would promote
the Facilitation Committee to the same status as the MSC and MEPC. These amendments have yet to enter
into force).
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standardized coordination mechanism. A suitable coordination mechanism
has been proposed at the IMO in response to the Castor incident, which
involves consideration of the rights of a vessel requiring assistance to enter a
port. The IMO generally treats the duty to assist and the obligation to rescue
as separate and independent. This Article will assert that important aspects
of the Tampa and Castor cases are substantially linked and should be
addressed concurrently. The Article concludes that this synchronized
approach will ensure consistency and efficacy in developing appropriate
international regimes and solutions.
II.

THE TAMPA, THE DUTY TO ASSIST, AND THE OBLIGATION TO RESCUE

On August 26, 2001, the Australian Rescue Coordination Center
alerted the M/V Tampa, a Norwegian cargo ship in Indonesian territorial
waters, to a sinking ferry, the PalapaI, approximately one hundred miles
northwest of Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean.4 The Tampa diverted
from its course and, guided by an Australian aircraft, reached the troubled
vessel shortly before dusk. The Tampa then successfully retrieved 438 men,
women and children, largely hailing from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and
Sri Lanka.'
Having found the sinking vessel in the Indonesia's Search and Rescue
6
("SAR") region, the Tampa, commanded by Ame Rinnan, originally
intended to return the rescuees to Indonesia before resuming its voyage to its
next port of call, Singapore. 7 However, shortly after the rescue, a group of
rescuees on board became alarmed and agitated at the prospect of returning
to Indonesia. 8 A few rescuees confronted the captain and threatened to take
drastic action, including undertaking a hunger strike or throwing themselves
overboard, if the ship did not head for "any Western country." 9 Due to the
sheer number of persons on board and the need for food and medical
supplies, Rinnan felt compelled to alter the ship's course to the nearest
' Christmas Island is a small and remote Australian island 200 miles from the Indonesian island of
Java and 930 miles west of the Australian mainland. Daniel Williams, Adrift and Unwanted; A Norwegian
Ship Saves 438 Asylum Seekers-and Triggers an Ugly Diplomatic Row Over Their Fate, TIME (Int'l Ed.),
Sept. 10, 2001, at 61
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See infra note 75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dispute over where the PalapaIwas
found.
7 Williams, supra note 3.
8 Paul Ham & Jamie Walker, Refugees Becalmed as Deal Stalls, TIMES NEWSPAPERS LTD., Sept 2,
2001, at 14.
9 Williams, supra note 3.
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(Western) port, at Christmas Island.10
The next day, August 27th, the Tampa was denied access to
Australian territorial waters as it attempted to enter the port at Christmas
Island." After two more days anchored fourteen nautical miles off the
island,1 2 diplomatic negotiations remained deadlocked and the situation on
board the Tampa worsened. Rinnan sent out a mayday call and proceeded to
enter Australian waters, disregarding the Australian government's decision
to refuse entry.1 3 Subsequently, a forty-five-person military unit from the
Australian Special Armed Services intercepted and boarded the Tampa,
directing it to leave Australian waters. 14 After an additional eight days at
sea, a diplomatic accord was reached: the rescuees were transferred to the

HMAS Manoora, an Australian naval vessel, by which
150 refugees were
5
taken to New Zealand and 288 were taken to Nauru.1
Captain Rinnan's actions received wide praise; he and his crew were
hailed as heroes and commended. 16 Captain Rinnan's decision to divert his
course to retrieve the survivors of the sinking ferry fulfilled his duty under
international law. In the confusing and complicated aftermath, the heroic
nature of his action became clear.

10 Id.
1 Michael White, The Tampa and the Law, SEAWAYS: INT'L 3. NAUTICAL INST., Oct. 2001, at 5.
"2 Australia claims a twelve nautical mile territorial sea. CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK 2001, 29 (2001).
13 Williams, supra note 3. The day before his mayday radio communications, Captain Rinnan
reported that he had "10 unconscious people, two pregnant women with stomach cramps, an outbreak of
scabies and widespread dysentery." Ham & Walker, supra note 8.
14 James C. Hathaway, Refuge Law is Not Immigration Law, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2002, 38
(2002).
15 Williams, supra note 3. Nauru admitted the persons rescued from the Tampa in exchange for "a
payment of about $7 million worth of fuel, about $1.6 million for new generators, the cancellation of about
$540,000 worth of hospital bills run up by Nauruans in Australia, refurbishments of the island's sports oval,
and the provision of sporting and educational scholarships for Naunsans to come to Australia." Hathaway,
supra note 14, at 40.
16 See Jessica E. Tauman, Comment, Rescued at Sea, But Nowhere to Go: The Cloudy
Legal Waters
ofthe Tampa Crisis, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 461, 477-79 (2002).
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The Duty to Assist

1. Source of the Duty to Assist
The obligation on masters to render assistance at sea is one of the
oldest and most deep-rooted maritime traditions. 17 In the 1880 British case,
Scaramangav. Stamp, the court stated:
To all who have to trust themselves to the sea it is of the utmost
importance that the promptings of humanity in this respect
should not be checked or interfered with by prudential
considerations which may result to a ship or cargo from the
rendering of the needed aid.' 8
This basic tenant of British common law was later codified in a
number of international conventions. The first international body to discuss
the principle of rendering assistance at sea was the Brussels Salvage
Convention in 1885.19 Slightly more than a decade later, in 1897, the
Comite Maritime International ("CMI") held its first international
conference in Brussels to advance issues regarding collisions and salvage, as
well as the duty to render assistance at sea.2 ° Under the CMI's direction, on
September 23, 1910, the final text of the Brussels Convention on Salvage
("Brussels Convention") was signed.21 In 1989, the IMO concluded the
International Convention on Salvage ("1989 Salvage Convention"), which
replaced the 1910 Brussels Convention.2 2

17 C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 369 (6th ed. 1967); Bernard H.
Oxman, Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 399, 414 (1997).
Scaramanga v. Stamp, 5 C.P.D. 295, 304 (1880).
This body, which met again in 1888, considered the development of international law regarding
INA H. WILDEBOER, THE BRUSSELS SALVAGE
collisions at sea and maritime salvage matters.
CONVENTION: ITS UNIFYING EFFECT IN ENGLAND, GERMANY, BELGIUM, AND THE NETHERLANDS 1 (1965).
20 Id. CMI held two more conferences, in 1900 and 1902, to draft an international convention on
salvage, which was completed in 1902. Id. Further diplomatic sessions were held to further refine the
convention between 1905 to 1910. Id. See also Alex L. Parks, The 1910 Brussels Convention, The United
States Salvage Act of 1912, and Arbitration of Salvage Cases in the United States, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1457,
1458 (1983).
21 See supra note 20. The United States is a signatory to the 1910 Salvage Convention and ratified it
on January 25, 1912. Patrick J. Long, The Good Samaritan and Admiralty: A Parableof a Statute Lost at
Sea, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 591, 595 (2000). Australia and Norway are also Parties. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
TREATIES INFORCE 408-409 (1999).
22 International Convention on Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-12 (entered into force
July 14, 1996) [hereinafter 1989 Salvage Convention].
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Prior to the Brussels Convention there were no formal international
conventions that addressed rendering assistance at sea. The essential
provision, as now set forth in Article 10 of the 1989 Salvage Convention,
states:
Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious
danger to his vessel, and persons thereon, to render assistance

to any person in danger of being lost at sea.... [T]he owner of
the vessel shall incur no liability for a breach of the master.
The duty of a master to render assistance at sea is also defined in the
24
International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea ("SOLAS Convention").
Regulation V/33(a) of the SOLAS Convention states:

2 Id. art. 11. This article was incorporated into U.S. law under 46 U.S.C. § 2304 (formerly 46
U.S.C. § 728). Section 2304 reads:
(a) A master or individual in charge of a vessel shall render assistance to any
individual found at sea in danger of being lost, so far as the master or individual in charge
can do so without serious danger to the master's or individual's vessel or-individuals on
board.
(b) A master or individual violating this section shall be fined not more than $1,000,
imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both.

Id.

24 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No.

9700, 164 U.N.T.S. 113, as amended (entered into force May 25, 1980) [hereinafter SOLAS Convention].
The genesis of SOLAS was the aftermath of the Titanic sinking on April 14, 1912. SIMMONDS, supra note
2, at 15. It is now arguably the most important international convention regarding maritime safety. In
response to the Titanic, the United Kingdom called for a conference to provide dialogue and measures for
preventing future loss of life at sea. Id. On November 12, 1913, delegations representing thirteen of the
world's various maritime powers met in London for the first SOLAS Convention. Id. The first SOLAS
Convention was signed on January 30, 1914; however, formal ratification of the treaty never took place due
to the outbreak of World War I. Id.
The second International Conference met again in London in April 16, 1929 and adopted its final
draft on May 31, 1929. Id. The 1929 SOLAS Convention came into force in 1933. SOLAS: the
InternationalConventionfor the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, Focus ON IMO, Oct. 1998, at 1. Since then,
the SOLAS Convention has been revised, re-adopted and re-ratified three more times (1948, 1960, and
1974). Id.
The 1974 SOLAS Convention, which entered into force in 1980, is the version currently in effect.
SOLAS Convention, supra note 24.
The SOLAS Convention has been adopted by 146 states
encompassing 98.49% of world's shipping tonnage.
Summary of Status of Conventions, at
www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topicid=247 (last visited Jan. 3, 2003). As its name suggests,
the SOLAS Convention largely deals with the safety of human life at sea, but also includes regulations
governing ship construction, standardization of safety equipment, radiocommunications, and operations and
navigation of ships.
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The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to
provide assistance, on receiving a signal from any source that
persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed
to their assistance, if possible informing them or the search and
rescue service, that the ship is doing so. If the ship receiving
the distress alert is unable or, in the special circumstances of the
case, considers it unreasonable or unnecessary to proceed to
their assistance, the master must enter in the log-book the
reason for failing to proceed to the assistance of the persons in
distress and, taking into account the recommendations of the
Organization, inform the appropriate search and rescue service

accordingly.25

The duty to render assistance also carries over to the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas ("1958 Convention") 26 and 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"). 27 The identical
articles of both conventions state:
Every state shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in
so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the
crew, or the passengers ...

to render assistance to any person

found at sea in danger of being lost...

28

These four international conventions are said to give "expression to
the general tradition and practice of all seafarers and of maritime law

regarding the rendering of assistance to persons or ships in distress at sea,
and the elementary considerations of humanity. '29 The 1989 Salvage
25 SOLAS Convention, supra note 24, reg. V/33.
26 The Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, (entered into force Sept.
30, 1962) 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter 1958 Convention].
27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 6, 1982, U.N. Doc.
AICONF. 62/122, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
28 1958 Convention, supra note 26, art. 12(a); UNCLOS, supra note 27, art. 98(1).
29 THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 571
(Myron Nordquist ed., 1993). The duty to provide assistance at sea is also required during wartime among
belligerent states. The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, states in Article 18:
After each engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible
measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect them
against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead
and prevent their being despoiled.
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Convention posits a duty "to render assistance to any individual ...found at
sea in danger of being lost." 30 The SOLAS Convention states that a master
is "bound to proceed with all speed to the assistance of the persons in
distress.'
The 1958 Convention and UNCLOS obligate a master "to
render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost. '32 Thus,
the duty placed on masters of vessels is only an obligation "to render
assistance,, 33 not to "rescue."
This distinction is important if the
international community is to arrive at a solution to prevent a Tampa-like
incident from recurring.
2.

Scope of the Duty to Assist

While the duty to render assistance clearly exists, the scope of that
assistance is not defined. It can be inferred from the text of the 1989
Salvage Convention, the SOLAS Convention, the 1958 Convention, and
UNCLOS that the language adopted was purposefully vague to allow
masters flexibility in their responses. Under the current language, masters
can take into account various factors such as ship size, weather, number of
persons in distress, the nature of distress, safety equipment on board,
possible infectious diseases, and security concerns when responding to
vessels in need.34 The Brussels Convention and the other international
instruments that followed "obviously [did] not go any further into the
manner in which the assistance can be rendered," because the possible
actions to be taken "are too diverse in character to describe in a few
words. 35
The calculated ambiguity of the phrase, "render assistance," allows
the master of the vessel to consider the circumstances of each distress case
and take the most prudent and practical action to relieve the distress of those
in peril. Thus, a master may decide to tow the vessel to safety, extricate a
Id.
30

1989 Salvage Convention, supra note 22, art. 10(1).

31 SOLAS, supra note 24, reg. V/33.
32

1958 Convention, supra note 26, art. 12(a); UNCLOS, supra note 27, art. 98(a).

3 The actual effect of these articles in imposing a legal duty, as opposed to a mere moral duty,
is

somewhat unclear. Some scholars argue that the applicability of these articles is of importance with respect
to tort law; that is, a master commits a tort if he/she does not comply with the obligation to render
assistance to those in peril at sea. See WILDEBOER, supra note 19, at 267. However others note that
traditional American tort principles do not impose civil liability on an individual failing to assist a stranger,
even at sea. See generally Long, supra note 21. With regard to criminal sanction, the U.S. criminal statute,
46 U.S.C. § 2304, has never been enforced. Id.
14 See WILDEBOER, supra note 19, at 95.
35 Id.
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grounded vessel, fight a fire aboard a ship, provide food and supplies,
embark crewmen aboard to replace the tired or the missing, secure aid or
assistance from other nearby ships, or simply stand-by to provide
navigational advice.36 In short, there are a variety of acts that a master may
take that may constitute "assistance."
A vessel's capability to assist may differ depending on the type and
size of the ship, its crew, and its supplies. 37 The ability to assist, once on
scene, is a moral and operational judgment that must be made by the master
depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case of the Tampa,
Captain Rinnan more than met his obligations, taking all survivors on board
and attempting to provide them with shelter, food, and medical care, even
though doing so was far beyond vessel's capabilities.3a He continued to
fulfill his obligations even after the Australian Government refused to allow
him entry and forced him to suffer costly delays. 39 This, in no small
measure, is where Captain Rinnan's actions went from representing mere
fulfillment of an obligation under the law to render assistance to an act of
heroism. The economic and personal hardships faced by the Tampa's crew
and owners created a situation that most others would avoid, and these
hardships could create a future disincentive for those at sea to render
assistance at all.4°
Id. See also MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SALVAGE 15 -31 (1958).
37 See, e.g., SOLAS Convention, supra note 24, Annex I, ch. V, reg. 14; International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, July 7, 1978, (entered into force Apr.
28, 1984), amended, reg. VI4 reprintedin INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, STCW 95 (2001);
STCW Code, Section A-VI/4, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, STCW 95, 141
Michael Richardson, In Migrant's Plight, a Sea of Trouble for Skippers; Australian Case Shows
(2001
36

Rescues Can Be Costly, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 6, 2001.
39 Id.
40 Numerous examples exist of cases in which vessels have failed to stop to render assistance to
those in peril at sea, especially after collisions. See, e.g., Jane Fritch, Balian Guilty in Viet Boat Case, to
Get Reprimand, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1989 (a U.S. Navy vessel failed to stop and assist Vietnamese
refugees at sea); Pamela Ferdinand, Canada Charges 3 Russians In Sinking of US. Fishing Boat; 3
Americans Were Killed in Collision off Newfoundland, WASH. POST, August 16, 2001 (Cypriot tanker
failed to acknowledge U.S Coast Guard requests for assistance after the tanker collided with a fishing
vessel); Andrew Osbourn, Norway's shame on the high seas. Collision with French vessel that left four
dead leads to bitter diplomatic row, OBSERVER, Sept. 1, 2002 (Norwegian tanker continued on its voyage
without stopping after colliding with a fishing vessel). Further, although stowaways have a different status
than those rescued at sea, finding stowaways on board creates an economic burden on masters and
shipowners, because, under most domestic regimes, the master or owner is responsible for repatriating the
stowaway. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a), 1323. This economic burden has led some masters to throw
stowaways overboard, if discovered while the ship is at sea. See Elissa Steglich, Note, Hiding in the Hulls:
Attacking the Practice of High Seas Murder of Stowaways Through Expanded Criminal Jurisdiction, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1323 (2000). The thought of these actions being repeated in the context of persons rescued at
sea is chilling. Martin Davies, Obligations and Implications for Ships Encountering Persons in need of
Assistance at Sea, 12 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 109 (2003).
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Certainly, one can only expect so much of a master who renders
assistance to those in need at sea, especially when the numbers of survivors
are great and the capabilities of the ship are limited. There must be some
mechanism for the master of a merchant vessel who renders assistance at sea
to be relieved of that burden. Assumption of that burden must necessarily
fall on governments, instead of individual masters.
Most of the actions contemplated by the above international
instruments, however, fall short of "rescue" as defined in the only treaty to
address the term in detail, the International Convention on Maritime Search
and Rescue ("SAR Convention"). The SAR Convention defines "rescue" as
"an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for the initial medical
or
other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety."'4 As discussed infra Part
II.B. 1., the obligation to rescue is on coastal states, not ships. However, as
the Tampa case has shown, even if the obligation to rescue was placed on
ships individually, the stumbling block would remain: "delivery to a place
of safety., 42 The Tampa, after declaring distress, was obviously not a
suitable long-term holding area for the rescuees, and thus was not a place of
safety.
B.

The Obligation to Rescue

1.

Source of the Obligation

The same conventions placing a duty on the master to assist also place
obligations on coastal and port states. The 1948 SOLAS Convention
("SOLAS 48") was the first instrument calling for the establishment of

41 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, April 27,
1979 (entered into force on
Jun. 22, 1985), T.I.A.S. No. 11093, as amended, Annex, para. 1.3.2 [hereinafter SAR Convention].
'z This conclusion is further reached in Annex, para. 4.8.3 of the SAR Convention regarding

termination of successful search and rescue operations, stating:
When a rescue co-ordination center or rescue sub-center considers, on the basis of
reliable information, that a search and rescue operation has been successful, or that the
emergency no longer exists, it shall terminate the search and rescue operation and
promptly so inform any authority, facility or service which has been activated or notified.
Id., Annex, para. 4.8.3.
Under this definition, a search and rescue operation is terminated after the "emergency no longer exists."
Id. Thus a ship that has been provided with needed food and supplies is deemed a "successful" search and
rescue operation without the need to take the person or ship ashore. Id.
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Chapter V,

Regulation 15, for the first time required each signatory to maintain

adequate search and rescue assets and equipment along its coast.44 This new
regulation was the first attempt of the international maritime community to
establish a system where governments had responsibility for rescue, rather
than making masters legally responsible for rescue.45 Today's version of the
governmental obligation to rescue is found in Chapter V, Regulation 7 of the

SOLAS Convention ("SOLAS Reg. V/7") 46 and incorporates concepts of
cooperation and rescue zones among search and rescue organizations, a
result of the SAR Convention coming into force. SOLAS Reg. V/7.1 states:
Each Contracting Government undertakes to ensure that
necessary arrangements are made for distress communication
and co-ordination in their area of responsibility and for the
rescue of persons in distress at sea around their coasts. These
arrangements shall include the establishment, operation and
maintenance of such search and rescue facilities as are deemed
practicable and necessary, having regard to the density of the
seagoing traffic and the navigational dangers and shall, so far as

possible, provide adequate means of locating and rescuing such

41 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, June 10, 1948, (entered into force Nov. 19,
1952) 164 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter SOLAS 48] (SOLAS 48 was superseded by the 1974 SOLAS
Convention, see supra note 24.
Chapter V, Reg. 15 of SOLAS 48 read:

(a) Each Contracting Government undertakes to ensure that any necessary
arrangements are made for coast watching and for the rescue of person in distress at sea
round its coasts. These arrangements should include the establishment, operation and
maintenance of such maritime safety facilities as are deemed practicable and necessary
having regard to the density of the seagoing traffic and the navigational dangers and
should, so far as possible, afford adequate means of locating and rescuing such persons.
(b) Each Contracting Government undertakes to make available information
concerning its existing rescue facilities and plans for change therein if any.
SOLAS 48, supra note 43, ch.V, reg. 15.
45 Of course, at the time, many countries had well-established search and rescue agencies with
extensive capabilities to provide assistance to those in distress at sea. For example, the United States,
either through the efforts of individual states, or through the United States Coast Guard and its predecessor
agencies has been providing search and rescue services since the 1800s. See Noble, A Legacy, The United
States Lifesaving Service, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile.
46 Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention Annex underwent substantial revision at the Maritime
Safety Committee's 73rd session, November 27 to December 6, 2000. These changes came into force July
1, 2002 under tacit acceptance. See Mammoth Session,
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=67&docid=383 (last visited January 18, 2003).
See infra note 149 and accompanying text for discussion of tacit acceptance process at the IMO.
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persons.47 (emphasis added).
The phrase "establishment, operations and maintenance" was later
adopted in the text of Article 98(2) of UNCLOS, which reads:
Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation
and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue
service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where
circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional
arrangements co-operate with neighboring States for this
purpose.48
However, where UNCLOS requires states only to "promote" maritime
SAR services, SOLAS requires each contracting state to "undertake" such
services "to ensure necessary arrangements are made." Details about exactly
what SAR services are necessary to fulfill the requirements of SOLAS,
however, are conspicuously absent.
Instead, those details are contained in the SAR Convention. Prior to
the development of the SAR Convention in 1979, the obligations to establish
maritime search and rescue facilities as stipulated in UNCLOS Article 98(2)
and SOLAS Reg. V/7 lacked coordination, links of communication, and
standardization between individual implementing states. 49 As a result,
national maritime services advanced in different directions causing
operational difficulties. 50 The SAR Convention was designed to correct
these deficiencies. Its primary aim, as stated in its preamble, is to establish
"an international maritime search and rescue plan responsible to the needs of
maritime traffic for the rescue of persons in distress at sea." 5t
The goal of the SAR Convention was to create a framework to
coordinate rescue efforts through a comprehensive maritime search and

47 SOLAS Convention, supra note 24, ch. V, reg. 7.1. The SOLAS Convention, Reg. V/7 states
"[r]efer to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), 1979, and to the following
resolutions adopted by the Organization: Homing capability of search and rescue (SAR) aircraft (Res.
A.225(VII)), Use of radar transponders for search and rescue purposes (Res. A.530(13)), Search and rescue
homing capability (Res. A.616(15)) and International Aeronautical and Maritime and Search and Rescue
(IAMSAR)
Manual
(Res. A.894(21))."
Search and Rescue Services, reg. 7,
n.*,
http://www.mcga.gov.uk/publications/SITE/safetyofhavigatioVn/regulations/regulationO7.htm
(last visited
January 18, 2003).
4 UNCLOS, supra note 27, art. 98(2).
49 SAMIR MANKABADY, THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 137-38 (1984).
so Id.
5' SAR Convention, supra note 41, pmbl.
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rescue system 52 that could reach any maritime emergency no matter where it
occurred globally. 53 Tlhe SA Convention called for the world's oceans to

be divided into thirteen SAR areas, where coastal states would be
responsible for specific SAR zones. 54

This laudable goal, however, proved difficult to achieve, even though
more states have become parties to the SAR Convention since it was revised
in 1998.55 Because the 1979 SAR Convention placed significant and
potentially costly obligations on signatories, many littoral countries have not
ratified or acceded to the Convention. Two of the three primary players in
the Tampa drama-Australia and Norway-are parties. Indonesia isnot.
C.

56

The Difference Between the Duty to Assist and the Obligation to
Rescue

The 1998 revisions to the SAR Convention, most importantly in the
' 57

context of the Tampa incident, created definitions for the terms "search

and "rescue ' 5t which in turn clarified the responsibilities of coastal states.59
" The revised SAR Convention elucidates states' duties to "participate in the development of a
search and rescue service." Id. at 2.1.1. The revised version accents a regional and cooperative approach
to maritime search and rescue by stating each State Party "shall, individually or in cooperation with other
States, ensure search and rescue regions are established within each sea area ..
Id.at 2.1.3. Also, Parties
"shall coordinate their search and rescue organizations and should, whenever necessary, coordinate search
and rescue operations with those of neighboring States." Id. at 3.1.1. In addition, the SAR Convention
prescribes that "[Plarties shall ensure the closest practicable coordination between aeronautical services"
and nautical services. Id.at 2.4.1.
53 James Brewer, GMDSS Makes ItsOfficial Debut Today... Over and Out, LLOYD'S LIST, Feb. 1,
1999, at 5. See also Leading Article: Rescue at Sea, LLOYD'S LIST, Feb. 1, 1997, at 5.
54 See supra note 53.
55 By 1995, due toits slow pace of acceptance, the international maritime community was ready for a
comprehensive review of the SAR Convention. Also in 1995, the tragedy of the Estonia, where over 900
people lost their lives after a "roll-on roll-roll off" ("Ro-Ro") ferry sank in the Baltic Sea, prompted the
IMO Secretary-General to establish a panel of experts on Ro-Ro safety to discuss and propose
improvement design and equipment to Ro-Ro ferries. The panel of experts proposed initial amendments to
the SAR Convention. A complete rewrite of the 1979 SAR Convention was then prepared at an
intersessional working group ("ISWG") established by the Maritime Safety Committee in October 1995. In
May 1997, the draft text was officially approved at the sixty-eighth session of the MSC and adopted in the
sixty-ninth session inMay 1998. On January 1, 2000, the revised SAR Convention entered into force.
56 Shipping Emergencies-Search and Rescue and the GMDSS, Focus ON IMO, Mar. 1999, at 3;
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 21, at 417.
57 Chapter 1.3.1 of the SAR Convention defines "Search" as "An operation, normally coordinated by
a rescue coordination centre or rescue sub-centre, using available personnel and facilities to locate persons
in distress." SAR Convention, supra note 41, ch. 1.3.1.
" See, infra Part II.C.
59 The revised Chapter 2, dealing with organizational structure, requires parties, "either individually
or, if appropriate, in cooperation with other State parties, to establish the following basic elements of search
and rescue services," which are identified as: "a legal framework; assignment of responsible authority;
organization of available resources; communication facilities; coordination and operational functions; and
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The creation of a definition of "rescue" which applies only to governments
also appears to have created a legal distinction between the duty
governments have to rescue and the "assistance" required of shipmasters.
Conventions is the term "rescue"
Nowhere in the SAR, SOLAS, and
60 Salvage
associated with a merchant ship.
UNCLOS, however, slightly blurs this distinction. Article 98(l)(b)
provides that every state must require masters of ships flying their flags "to
proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if
in so far as such action may be
informed of their need of assistance,
61
reasonably expected of him."
UNCLOS does not specify whether the expectation in the last clause
refers to "rescue" or to "assistance., 62 However, the 1998 amendments to
the SAR Convention appear to have created a new legal landscape where
"masters assist" and "parties rescue." 63 If this is so, then the action referred
to in the last clause of UNCLOS Article 98(1)(b) would refer to merchant
ships "rescuing," "inso far as such action may be reasonably expected of
of safety.",64
them," that is, if the merchant ship can be considered a "place
processes to improve the service, including planning, domestic and international cooperative relationships
and training." SAR Convention, supra note 41, ch. 2.1.2. In order to "support efficient search and rescue
are obligated to ensure "the coordinated use of available facilities," and "establish close
operations," parties
cooperation between serviced and organizations" contributing "to improve search and rescue services." Id.,
ch. 2.2.2. Parties, individually or in cooperation with other states, are required to operate twenty-four hour
rescue coordination centers staffed by English speaking staffs. Id., ch. 2.3.3. Other Chapters in the revised
SAR Convention concern: Chapter 3, the Cooperation Between States; Chapter 4, Operating Procedures
(which integrated the original Chapters 4 on Preparatory Measures); and Chapter 5, Ship Reporting
Systems. SAR Convention, supra note 41.
6o Compare SOLAS Convention supra note 24, ch. V, reg. 33 with reg. 7. The SAR Convention
places no obligations on merchant ships, only Parties. See e.g., SAR Convention, supra note 41, Annex;
Salvage Convention, supra note 22, art. 10.
61 UNCLOS, supra note 48, art. 98(l)(b).
62 id.
63 SAR Convention, supra note 41.
64 It is not fully clear whether the SAR Convention so amended the interpretation of UNCLOS.
Article II of the SAR Convention states:

Other treatiesand interpretation
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the codification and development of
(1)
the law of the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened
pursuant to resolution 2759(XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations nor the
present or future claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the sea and
the nature and extent of coastal and flag State jurisdiction.
No provision of the Convention shall be construed as prejudicing obligations or
(2)
rights of vessels provided for inother international instruments.
Id., art. II.
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Moreover, the structure of UNCLOS Article 98 places the determination of
whether "rescue" may he.re nnahy eynected of a Ship on the flag state, not
the coastal state.6
.
Thus, in the Tampa case, when Captain Rinnan declared his vessel in
distress, a condition which Norway, the flag state, supported,66 the vessel
was not a place of safety, and Australia could not reasonably conclude that a
"rescue" had occurred. More to the point, Australia's determination would
seem to require consultation and coordination with the flag state.
Chapter 3 of the Annex to the SAR Convention, hopefully titled "CoOperation between States," unfortunately does not address resolution of
situations such as those faced by the Tampa, where a vessel rendering
assistance seeks disembarkation of survivors (in essence, final "rescue").
Other than a very general call for states to enter into agreements, where
appropriate, to strengthen search and rescue cooperation and coordination,
Chapter 3 mainly concerns entry into the territorial seas of one party by
search and rescue units 67 of another party. 68 Since the Tampa would not

meet the definition of a search and rescue unit, 69 Chapter 3 would not apply.
During the revision of the SAR Convention at COMSAR 1, the
United States introduced proposed language in Chapter 3 of the SAR
Convention that read:
In implementing provisions of [chapter 3], Parties should bear
in mind... the necessity of balancing concerns of sovereignty
and concerns for saving lives, obligations of ship masters
regarding response to persons in distress, and the time-critical
nature of many rescue operations.7 °

However, it does not appear that the interpretation posited in this paper would prejudice any rights or
obligations of vessels. They would still be required to "proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of
persons," but if they were not a "place of safety" it could not be expected for them to complete the rescue,
only assist. This does not appear to be inconsistent with UNCLOS, nor does it raise any conflict with
UNCLOS or the SAR Convention.
65 UNCLOS, supra note 48, art. 98. The coastal state is not referred to in this Article.
66 See IMO Circular Letter No. 2363 (Feb. 1, 2002) (containing Notes Verbale dated September 1,
2001 and January 29, 2002 from the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway to the
Embassy of Australia, Olso, Norway).
6' A "search and rescue unit" is defined as "a unit composed of trained personnel and provided with
equipment suitable for expeditious conduct of search and rescue operations." SAR Convention, supra note
41, Annex, ch. 1.3.8. Because the Tampa was not properly equipped to conduct a "rescue" under the SAR
Convention, it would not be considered a search and rescue unit.
68 SAR Convention, supra note 41, Annex, para. 3.1.1 - 3.1.5.
69 See supra note 67.
70 Ro-Ro Ferry Safety, SAR Convention Review, IMO Document COMSAR 1/13 (Submitted by the
United States, Nov. 5, 2001), at para. 3.1.6.
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The language proposed touches most, if not all, of the issues raised by the
Tampa case, and likely would have facilitated discussion at the IMO after
the Tampa incident occurred. But the language was not adopted.
III.

THE IMO RESPONSE TO THE TAMPA

A.

Callsfor Action, Review and Proposals

The IMO became involved in facilitating solutions to the Tampa
Incident within days of its occurrence, with the receipt of copies of Notes
Verbale exchanged between Norway and Australia, which both countries
asked to be circulated to all IMO members. 7 ' The Notes Verbale were
careful to distinguish between the "assistance " rendered by the Tampa, and
"rescue." 72 However, among other disputed facts within the Notes, Australia
argued that the rescue was complete when the refugees were aboard the
Tampa, despite Captain Rinnan's declaration of distress due to overloading
and lack of supplies. 73 Norway, on the other hand, charged that Australia
had created "a most unwelcome obstacle to prevent seafarers from being
rescued when they are in distress or shipwrecked., 74 The clashing Notes
Verbale illustrated the potential for different interpretations of the term
"rescue," and the lack of coordination and cooperation that hampered
resolution of the case.75 This obvious friction, directly implicating one or
more instruments
administered by the IMO, led Secretary General William
76
O'Neill to act.

" See IMO Circular Letter No. 2363, supra note 66; IMO Circular Letter No. 2345 (Oct. 15, 2001)
(containing a Notes Verbale between the Embassy of Australia, Copenhagen, Denmark and the Royal
Ministy of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway, Olso).
72

Id.

73 IMO Circular Letter No. 2345, supra note 71, at 2.
74 IMO Circular Letter No. 2363, supra note 66, at 2.
7' The Notes Verbale differ in the facts of the case in a number of instances, including in whose
search and rescue zone the Tampa was located at the time of the distress call (Australia or Indonesia), the
actual communications, and the direction (if any) the Tampa received from Australian search and rescue
authorities. See supra note 67; see supra notes 66 & 71.
76 Indeed, Australia continues to argue that a foreign merchant ship should provide rescue services
without the coordination or consent of the flag state. In June 2002, the Australian Department of Transport

and Regional Services published its Protocolfor CommercialShipping Rescuing Persons at Sea In or
Adjacent to the Australian Search and Rescue Region,
http:www.dotrs.gov.au/transinfra/searescueprotocol.htm [hereinafter Australian Protocol]. While
recognizing that all search and rescue operations must be cases prosecuted in accordance with international
law, it creates a three-stage system for merchant vessels to effect "rescue," including a mandate that "Ships
(including available naval ships) according to international conventions and deviate from courses to effect
rescue. Normal proactive would be for the Master to advise the Owner of the deviation. If no ships
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In November 2001, Secretary General O'Neill approached the IMO
Council, which approves the committee work programs nd sets the IMO's
overall agenda.7 7 In Council Paper C/ES.21/24(a), O'Neill asked that the
Council forward to the Assembly a Draft Resolution calling for the Maritime
Safety Committee ("MSC"), the Legal Committee, and the Facilitation
Committee to review all relevant IMO instruments under their scope for any
legal deficiencies, with outcomes to be reported to the IMO Assembly in
November 2003.78 Further, the Secretary General informed the Council that
he had notified other competent U.N. specialized agencies, including the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, and would coordinate with
them. 79 The Secretary General urged the IMO member states to heed its
concerns that "[u]nless the matter is considered in all its respects and action
is taken at the appropriate level, such incidents may have a negative impact
on the integrity of the search and rescue system which the [IMO] has put in
place globally to assist those found in distress at sea."80
1.

IMO Assembly Action

In response to the Secretary General's request, the Assembly, during
its twenty-second session in November 2001, adopted Assembly Resolution
A.920(22), entitled "Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for the
Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea., 81 The Resolution instructs the
committees identified by the Secretary General "to review, on a priority
basis, the international conventions.., and any other IMO instruments under
the scope for the purpose of identifying any existing gaps, inconsistencies,
ambiguities, vagueness or other inadequacies." The purpose of this review

respond to the distress alert AusSAR [the Australian Search and Rescue Service] will examine any
available ship in the general area to see if they can attend to the rescue." (emphasis added). Id. The
Australian Protocol is silent on the situation where the ship is unable to effect a SAR Convention rescue
because it does not qualify as a place of safety, nor does is make any allowances for ships for which rescue
could not be reasonably expected, as described in UNCLOS, supra note 41, art. 98(l)(b).
77 IMO Convention, supra note 2, Part IV.
78 Review of Safety Measures and Proceduresfor the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, 21st
Extraordinary Sess., Agenda Item 24(a), IMO Paper C/ES.21/24(a), (Nov. 5, 2001).
79 Id., para.
6.
8o 22nd Assembly Agrees to Hold Maritime Security Conference in December 2002, IMO NEWS
RELEASE, at http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic-id=144&doc-id=1747 (last visited Jan.
22, 2003).
81 Review of Safety Measures and Proceduresfor the Treatment of Persons Rescued at
Sea, 22nd
Sess., Agenda Item 8, IMO Assembly Res. A.920(22) (Nov. 2001).
82 id.
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was to ensure that three international principles were fully realized, namely
that:
(l)survivors of distress incidents are provided assistance
regardless of nationality or status or the circumstances in which
they are found,
(2)ships, which have retrieved persons in distress at sea, are
able to deliver the survivors to a place of safety, and
(3)survivors, regardless of nationality or status, including
undocumented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and
stowaways, are treated, while on board, in the manner
prescribed in the relevant IMO instruments and in accordance
with relevant international agreements
and long-standing
83
humanitarian maritime traditions.
The negotiating history of the Secretary General's proposed resolution
sheds light on what is really the crux of the issue regarding persons rescued
at sea. During consideration of the Resolution at Council and at Assembly,
Norway proposed a number of changes to the Secretary General's original
draft, many of which were accepted 8 4 These included requests that the
MSC, the Legal Committee, and the Facilitation Committee, when
undertaking their reviews, take into account the rules and principles of
general international law with respect to the duty to render assistance to
distressed persons85 and to identify needs for possible codification and
development of these rules and principles. Norway also proposed that the
second operative paragraph of the Assembly Resolution, requesting that the
committees take appropriate action so that ships retrieving persons at sea are
able to deliver the survivors to a place of safety, be amended so that the
language would read "ships which have retrieved persons in86distress at sea
are able to deliver the survivors ashore with no undue delay.,
The Norwegian proposal that included the concept of delivery ashore
in the Assembly Resolution was questioned by a number of delegations,
including those of the United States and Australia.87 The reasoning was,
83 Id.
84 See Report of the Technical Committee to the Plenary, 22nd Sess., Agenda Item 5(b), IMO
Assembly Doc. A 22/5(b)/2, para. 75 (Nov. 28, 2001); IMO Assembly Doc. A. 22/C.1/3-A (Nov. 23, 2001)
(submitted by Norway).
"5 See infra Part III.A.3
86 IMO Assembly Doc. A 22/C. 1/3-A, supra note 84.
87 Personal observation of the authors.
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rather than embodying this new concept in an Assembly Resolution, which
88
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---0--the more appropriate course of action was to consider the concept as a
potential 89amendment to the SAR Convention, specifically the definition of
"rescue." This compromise was accepted and the Resolution was adopted
90
without the "delivery ashore" language.
ltk

2.

FacilitationCommittee Action

After the adoption of Assembly Resolution A.920(22), the IMO
Committees and Subcommittees began consideration of the issue in earnest.
The Facilitation Committee was the first with competence over the issue to
meet after the adoption of Resolution A.920(22).
The. Committee
recognized that the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime
Traffic ("FAL Convention"), the only relevant convention under its
competence, contained no provisions for the landing of persons rescued at
sea. However, many delegations pointed out that the purpose of the FAL
Convention was to facilitate and expedite international maritime traffic.
Therefore, consideration of the changes to SOLAS and the SAR Convention
might be more appropriate, although outside the scope of the FAL.92
During the Facilitation Committee meeting, Denmark proposed an
amendment to the FAL Convention stating that when a ship has retrieved
persons in distress at sea, public authorities in the next port of call or the
nearest port shall allow disembarkation of such persons. The public
authorities shall decide whether they are admissible according to national
law and if not, shall arrange for their reception in a third country. The
Facilitation Committee noted that these concepts
were a possible way
93
forward, but took no decisions on the matter.

8s For example, the United States has a policy of intercepting illegal migrants on ships while they are
still at sea and repatriating them, usually without these migrants touching U.S. territory. Alien Migrant
Interdiction, Overview, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/AMIO.htrn.
9 U.S. Negotiating Paper for the IMO Assembly, 22nd Sess., Agenda Item 5(b) (Nov. 2001) (on file
at the Office of Maritime and International Law, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington D.C.).
90 Cf Review ofSafety Measures and Proceduresof the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, supra
note 81.
9' Convention on the Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, April 9, 1965 (entered into force
Mar. 6, 1967), 18 U.S.T 411, TIAS 6251, 591 U.N.T.S. 265; Report of the Twenty-Ninth Session of the
FacilitationCommittee, 29th Sess., Agenda Item 18, IMO Paper FAL 29/18 (Jan. 30, 2002).
92 Id.

9' Id., para. 9.2.
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COMSAR Action

In February 2002, the Sub-Committee of Radio-Communications and
Search and Rescue ("COMSAR") began the comprehensive review
mandated by the Assembly. 94 Its Working Group on Search and Rescue
considered two proposals regarding amendments of the SOLAS and SAR
Conventions.
The first of these was from Norway, which proposed
amending the SAR Convention along the lines they had proposed for
resolution A.920(22). 95 A second, more detailed proposal from France was
considered. 96
Some aspects of these proposals seem fairly noncontroversial, such as a conforming amendment in SOLAS to match the
SAR requirement that persons in distress at sea receive assistance regardless
of their nationality or status. 97 However, France also proposed more
controversial amendments to SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 33, regarding a
master's responsibilities to render assistance at sea, stating that "masters of
ships who have rescued survivors of a shipwreck must be able to land them
at the nearest suitable place, taking into account the number of survivors, the
size of the vessel and its route." 98 France proposed that an affected coastal
state's rescue coordination centers determine the most suitable place to land
survivors. 99 In making that determination, parties should endeavor to
'4 COMSAR had been tasked with the comprehensive review of the SOLAS and SAR Conventions
at an extraordinary meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee held in conjunction with the 22nd
Assembly. Report of the FirstExtraordinarySession of the Maritime Safety Committee, 1st Extraordinary
Sess., Agenda Item 4, Maritime Safety Committee Document MSC/ES.1/4, para.3.8 (Nov. 28, 2001).
95 Draft Proposal by Norway to Amend IMO Convention, Feb. 8, 2002 (paper on file at Office of
Maritime and International Law, United States Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington D.C.). This
proposal was submitted at COMSAR 6 during the SAR Working Group deliberations.
16 Review of Safety Measures and Proceduresfor the Treatment of Persons Rescued
at Sea, 6th
Sess., Agenda Item 8, Sub-Committee on Radiocormunications and Search and Rescue Doc. COMSAR
6/8/5/Rev. 1, (Dec. 11, 2001) (submitted by France). Revised in COMSAR 6/8/5/Rev.1.

97 id.

98 Id.

99 Id. The text of the French proposal reads:
SAR proposal: add the following paragraphs:
3.1.6.4 To take the steps necessary, with the assistance of rescue co-ordination centers
(or other regular points of contact) in the countries concerned, to determine the most
suitable place to land survivors of a shipwreck, taking into account, inter alia,
their
number, the conditions on board the rescue ship and its first port of call.
3.1.9
The Parties try, in so far as they are able, to respond positively to requests from
their own rescue co-ordination centers, and those of other countries, for permission to
land rescued shipwreck survivors, even though it may lead to their freedom being
restricted when the law of the host country is applied, should not be used as an argument
for refusing them permission to land.
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respond positively to requests to land survivors. 100 If the survivors' legal
status in the port of landing would lead to their freedom being
10 1 restricted, this

should not be used as a reason to refuse permission to land.
The delegation of Australia, supported by the United States, opposed
proposals to amend SOLAS and SAR that would have the effect of

extending the convention obligations to encompass disembarkation of
rescued persons at a particular port. ° 2 This objection also encompassed
including in any convention an implied or direct provision that the master of
the rescuing vessel should have the ultimate right to decide the time and
place of landing.

°3

Both countries expressed views that this was the

responsibility of the coastal state to arrange on a case-by-case basis,
coordinating with all interested countries including the flag state of the
rescuing vessel.' 0 4 The complexity of the issues and the effects outside the
scope of the SAR and SOLAS Conventions and the Sub-Committee, such as
the status of persons rescued, and refugee issues, would be directly raised by
giving masters the right to land survivors. In the view of the opposing

countries, this was beyond IMO's reach.0 5 However, there was full
agreement by the Sub-Committee that any action taken should not have the
effect of deterring the master from fulfilling the obligation to render
nor should the global SAR system currently
assistance to persons in distress,
10 6
in place be compromised.

The rescue co-ordination center of sub-center, on behalf of the ships that have
4.8.5
rescued the survivors of a shipwreck, searches for the most suitable place to land them,
taking into account, inter alia, the captain's wishes, the number of survivors, their needs,
the conditions on board the rescue ship and its first port of call. It then informs the ships
concerned.
This proposed text was considered in detail by the informal group meeting in Noorkoping, Sweden in
September 2002, described infra, Part V. That group recommended to the IMO that this text not be
considered further. See Outcome of Informal Meeting on "Safety Measures and Proceduresfor the
Treatment ofPersons Rescued at Sea," 76th Sess., Agenda Item 22, Maritime Safety Committee Doc. MSC
76/22/11 (Sept. 27, 2002).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 US. Negotiating Position Paperfor the IMO Subcommittee on Communications and Search and
Rescue, 6th Sess., Agenda Item 2 (Feb. 2002) (on file at the Office of Maritime and International Law, U.S.
Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter U.S. COMSAR Position Paper].
103Id.
104id.
105Id.
106Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, 6th Sess., Agenda Item 12, Sub-Committee on
Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue Doc. COMSAR 6/12 (Mar. 8, 2002).
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Based on these discussions, COMSAR made a number of decisions,
including the need to clarify the term "place of safety" in the definition of
"rescue" in the SAR Convention and elsewhere. 10 7 The U.S. position
was
that a place of safety could include transfer to another vessel that is equipped
to care for the survivors until a final landing port can be established." 8
Other decisions of COMSAR were that the relevant Rescue Coordination
Centers should coordinate where to deliver persons after their rescue, that
the complexity of the issues required that MSC revisit the need to amend any
instruments, and that intersessional meetings, along the lines proposed in
Resolution A.920(22), might be required.10 9
4.

Maritime Safety Committee Action

The seventy-fifth session of the MSC, the parent committee for
COMSAR, met in May 2002 and continued review of the issue. France
submitted an amended version of their COMSAR proposal, adding
suggestions for conforming amendments to the Facilitation Convention to
complement their proposals for the SOLAS and SAR Conventions." 0
Germany submitted a paper supporting the French position, including a
suggestion for intersessional meetings."' Norway took a more forward
approach in its submission to MSC, proposing amendments to both SOLAS
and SAR that would create both a right of masters to deliver rescued persons
to the closest or a more convenient port for the rescuing ship, and creating an
obligation on contracting states to accept survivors in ports decided upon by
the master. 1 2 The Norwegian proposal for both conventions reads:
(a)
The master of a ship having retrieved persons in distress
at sea has the duty and the right to deliver these persons to a
place of safety with no undue delay. In such circumstances the
master of the ship having retrieved persons in distress is entitled
to decide as follows:
107 Id.

U.S. COMSAR Position Paper, supra note 102.
09 Id.
1i0 Safety Measures and Proceduresfor the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea,
Maritime Safety
Committee Doc. MSC 75/11/1 (Mar. 4, 2002) (submitted by France).
...
Safety Measures and Proceduresfor the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, Maritime Safety
Committee Doc. MSC 75/11/2 (Mar. 11, 2002) (submitted by Germany).
112 Safety Measures and Proceduresfor the Treatment of Persons Rescued
at Sea, Maritime Safety
Committee Doc. MSC 75/2/2/Add.2 (Mar. 12, 2002) (submitted by Norway) [hereinafter Norwegian Safety
Measures and Procedures].
I0'
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to deliver those persons to a suitable port or in the
.1
territorial waters being closest to the position where the persons
were retrieved, or

to deliver those persons to a suitable port or in its
.2
territorial waters being closest in case the ship continues its
planned voyage towards its next port of call in accordance with
the master's decision.
(b) In cases as described in paragraph l(a) above, Parties
shall allow such ships access to the territorial waters and to the
ports decided by the ship in accordance with those provisions.
Parties shall receive the persons rescued with no undue delay,
and shall provide for their medical care and other needs in a
place of safety. If such a ship has proceeded to territorial
waters not provided with a port suitable for the ship in question,
for the people
the Party shall provide the assistance necessary
3
rescued to disembark safely and rapidly.'"
During the plenary discussion of the issue at the seventy-fifth session
of the MSC, many countries presented lengthy, detailed interventions,
supporting differing views.' 4 The Norwegian/French proposals were not
fully embraced by Australia, the United States, and others." 5 Given this

113 Id. See also Outcome of Informal Meeting on "Safety Measures and Proceduresfor the Treatment

of Persons Rescued at Sea, " supra note 99 (where the informal group meeting in Noorkoping, Sweden in
September 2002, discussed infra, Part V brought this language forward for further consideration by the
MSC).
114 Australia, the United States, Norway, Malta, Turkey, and Singapore all made statements. Report
of the Maritime Safety Committee, 75th Sess., Maritime Safety Committee Doc. MSC 75/24, para. 11.53
(May 29, 2002) [hereinafter MSC 75/24]; Personal observations of the authors.
..5 Statement of Rear Admiral Paul Plut, U.S. Coast Guard, Assistant Commandant for Marine
Safety and Environmental Protection and Head of the U.S. Delegation to seventy fifth session of the MSC,
before the plenary session May 16, 2002 (transcript on file at the U.S. Department of State, Office of
Oceans Affairs, Washington, DC). The statement included the following:
The United States fully supports the legal obligation for masters to assist persons in
distress at sea as set forth in SOLAS and UNCLOS, and further agrees that such rescue
efforts should be undertaken without regard to the nationality, status or circumstances of
the persons in distress, as provided in SAR Convention. Our primary concern is to
promote safety at sea and humanitarian principles. When a ship is involved in a rescue,
at no time will the United States permit the lives of those rescued or of others on board
the ship to be jeopardized. Current United States practice on the disposition of persons
rescued at sea is determined on a case-by-case basis, with our Rescue Coordination
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wide gulf of legal opinion, the Committee, with the assistance of the
Swedish Maritime Administration, agreed to hold an informal meeting to
1 16
develop and refine the matters within the scope of Resolution A.920(22).

Centers serving as the primary coordination point for delivering survivors to a place of
safety.
Management of such cases must consider many factors, including the safety and
humanitarian treatment of persons rescued, commercial interests, and ability of those
rescued to legally enter a particular jurisdiction. Other legitimate factors may also affect
the time and place where survivors are delivered. Substantial time is sometimes needed
to conduct the intemational coordination required to determine where survivors should
ultimately be delivered. In such cases, the practice of the United States is remove the
survivors from the rescuing ship if it is a commercial vessel, sometimes transferring
survivors to government vessels, and provide for their temporary care. We give high
priority to the security, safety and care of survivors.
Because of the varied nature of cases encountered, the U.S. does not support the
creation of new obligations requiring a coastal State to respond in a particular manner
regarding delivery of persons rescued without regard to the circumstances of the
individual case. We do not agree that the master of a ship or any other single entity
should be given authority to decide where to deliver survivors. This must be a
coordinated decision among the governments involved. Instead, we believe that the
current obligation in the SAR Convention requiring delivery to a place of safety
adequately captures the obligations of masters and governments, because a place of
safety can also include an appropriately staffed and equipped rescue vessel that can
provide for the basic human needs of survivors until their final destination can be
determined.
ld.
MSC 75/24, supra note 114. The terms of reference were laid out in the MSC
Report, which

16

included:
To continue the review of the provisions of the SOLAS and SAR Conventions regarding
the treatment of person rescued at sea. The review should be given high priority and
should be completed at COMSAR 8. The results to be reported the Committee should, if
appropriate, include specific proposals for amendments to these Conventions.
To consider whether additional guidance should be devolved for shipmasters,
RCCs, coastal States and other interested parties to ensure that persons rescued at sea are
delivered to a place of safety;
To identify other issues raised during its debate and include them in the report to
MSC 7 as issues that the Organization should forward to other international organizations
that have a responsibility related this issue.
To also consider the possible need for, or desirability of, effecting amendments to
the FAL and Salvage Conventions regarding provisions relating to persons rescued at sea
or in distress at sea. This task, which would involve the FAL and LEG Committees
respectively, should be given lower priority than the review of the SOLAS and SAR
Conventions.
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The significant outcome of that informal meeting is described in Part V,
infra.
At MSC, the Secretary General noted that the issue of persons rescued
at sea was brought to the attention of other competent U.N. specialized
agencies and pointed out the need for a coordinated U.N. inter-agency
approach. 17 The Secretary General also proposed establishing a coordinated
mechanism within the United Nations to ensure a consistent response to any
future globally urgent situations. 1 8
Analysis ofActions Proposed and Taken

B.

The French and Norwegian proposals to allow masters assisting
persons rescued at sea to determine their port of disembarkation, if accepted,
would represent a significant change in traditional international maritime
law. While the discretion of a ship's master to take appropriate action to
ensure the safety of his or her ship is extremely broad,"' it is not unfettered,
and should not include the absolute right to enter any port of the master's
choosing. Although UNCLOS is silent on the right of port entry in cases of
distress, most commentators view it as a customarily accepted "universal
right."' 120 However, this right is not absolute. The ship may not have the
right where human life is not at risk, or where entry into the port would
port state. 21
impact the safety and health of the port and the citizens of the
Churchill and Lowe noted that the decision to allow a ship to enter port in
these circumstances "should be taken by weighing the gravity of the ship's
situation against the probability, degree and kind1 22of harm to the coastal state
that would arise were the ship allowed to enter."
While Churchill and Lowe imply that this analysis would be
undertaken in cases where the threat of pollution exists, in the case of the
Tampa it seems Australia undertook the same analysis regarding the entry of
undesired persons into a port. Although Captain Rinnan had declared a

117 Id.
118 Id.

u9 See, e.g., SOLAS supra note 24, reg. 34(3), ("The owner, the charterer, or the company, as defined
in Regulation XI/I, operating the ship or any other person shall not prevent or restrict the master of the ship
from taking or executing any decision which, in the master's professional judgment, is necessary for safe
navigation and protection of the marine environment").
120 See 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF THE SEA, AIR AND SPACE,
288 (1989); R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA (3d ed. 1992). But see A. PEARCE
HIGGINS AND C. JOHN COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, §140, at 113 (2d ed., 1951).
121
122

Id.
id.
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distress aboard Tampa because of overloading, the lack of medical supplies
and food, Australia concluded either that no lives were in danger of being
lost, or that entry into Australian territory at Christmas Island threatened the
safety of that port. 123 Whatever Australia's legal justification for denial, the
result was the same: a merchant vessel, in fulfilling its duty to render
assistance under international law was, for a time, left to fend for itself until
a solution to could be developed. This is the primary similarity between the
Tampa and the Castor.
The Norwegian proposal brought forward at the MSC places
tremendous discretion in the hands of masters, including rights to deliver
persons to a place of safety (mixing the SAR Convention obligation on
coastal states with master's obligations in SOLAS and elsewhere), and the
124
right to unilaterally decide which port to enter to disembark survivors.
Under the proposal, port and coastal states would be largely be required to
comply with the wishes of the master. 25 Such a result would turn
international law on its head, subordinating the sovereignty of the coastal
state to govern their own waters to the desires of the master of a foreign
ship. Further, creating such rights in the master also creates a great potential
for abuse. Captain Rinnan, who acted with only the highest regard for the
tradition of assisting persons in need at sea, could likely have benefited from
exercising rights such as those proposed by Norway. However, an
unscrupulous master could use these rights as a vehicle to create distress
situations, then exercise the rights to land migrants seeking to enter countries
illegally. Given this potential for abuse, a more measured requirement for
coordination and cooperation to relieve masters of their responsibilities after
assisting persons in distress seems necessary.

123 The

Note Verbale from Australia to Norway indicates both bases, noting that "the rescue had been

completed" and that its "international search and rescue obligations were concluded at that point" and that
the direction for the Tampa not to enter Australian territorial waters "was made in view of the fact that the
vessel was carrying intended unauthorized arrivals who wished to enter Australia illegally." MO Circular
Letter 2345, supra note 71.
:24 Norwegian Safety Measures and Procedures,supra note 112.
125 id.
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In December 2000, the Castor, a Cypriot flagged tanker with 29,500
tons of gasoline, departed Constanza, Romania en route to Lagos, Nigeria. 126
While underway in the Mediterranean Sea, the Castor, built in 1977,
developed a twenty-six meter crack in the hull of the ship that ran from port
to starboard halfway along its length. 127 The structural damage placed the
vessel in jeopardy of breaking up, risked an explosion, and caused a large oil
spill.121
Escorted by a rescue tug, the Castor spent over a month navigating
the Mediterranean, seeking a port that would accept it in order to offload its
cargo and make repairs. 129 However, the Castor's request fell on deaf ears.
The Mediterranean countries of Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Italy, Malta,
Tunisia, and Spain, and the130territory of Gibraltar all rejected the Castor's
appeals to enter their ports.
After forty days and over a thousand miles aimlessly navigating the
31
Mediterranean, the Castor's owners contracted for commercial salvage.'
With some assistance from Spanish authorities, the Castor was towed to a
sheltered area off the coast of Tunisia,
32 where its cargo was safely offloaded
to two small tankers without a spill.'
B.

The IMO Response-Places ofRefuge

The concept of providing places of refuge for ships in need of
assistance was a natural outgrowth of the general international law principle
that foreign ships in distress should be allowed into port, except in
extraordinary circumstances.' 33 Indeed, the IMO had begun consideration of
the issue prior to the Castor incident. The Working Group on Oil Tanker
126Donald Urquhart Stricken Vessel Off Europe Denied Refuge, Bus. TIMES (SINGAPORE), Jan. 12,

2001, at 1.
127Id.

'28CastorIncident HighlightsPlight ofDisabledShips- "Sheltered Waters" to be Tackled as Matter
of Urgency, IMO NEWS, No. 3, May 25, 2001, at 6 [hereinafter Sheltered Waters].
29Urquhart, supra note 126.
130
Brian Reyes, Salvage: Salvage Chief Warns that "Leper" Ship Will Sink, LLOYD'S LIST, Jan. 29,
2001, at 3. See also Urquhart, supra note 126.
131
Reyes, supra note 130; Urquhart, supra note 126.
132Sheltered Waters, supra note 128.
131
See infra Part II.A.1.
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Safety and Environmental Matters was established by the MSC in
November, 2000, to consider safety-related issues in the wake of the
catastrophic TN Erika oil spill off the coast of France.1 34 Among the issues
identified by the Working Group was "the examination of the need to
establish principles for coastal states, acting either individually or on a
regional basis, to review their contingency arrangements regarding provision
of ports of refuge."' 35 The Castor incident, where the ship was unable to
locate a place of refuge and had to effect a response on the high seas added
136
to the urgency of that need. At the first opportunity after the Castor,
Secretary General O'Neill stated "the time had come for [the IMO] to
undertake, as a matter of priority, a global consideration of the problem."
He further suggested "measures be developed to ensure that, in the interests
of safety of life and environmental protection, coastal states review their
contingency arrangements so that disabled ships can be
' 37 provided with
assistance and facilities appropriate to the circumstances."'
The first country to take a formal position on the issue at the IMO was
Spain, one of the coastal states refusing entry to the Castor,but the state that
eventually provided the most assistance to the stricken ship.' 38 The Spanish
Government opined that:
[t]he right of a vessel in distress to enter a port, place of refuge
or territorial waters must be interpreted solely as the right to
preserve or save the lives of its crew and its passengers,
and.., such right of entry cannot exist when
39 measures have
already been taken to save persons onboard.1

134See Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-third Session, 73rd Sess., Agenda
Item 21, Maritime Safety Committee Doe. MSC 73/21 (Dec. 12, 2000). The T/V Erika was a Malteseflagged tanker that broke up off the coast of France in December 1999, causing extensive damage to the
marine environment. See e.g., Peter Shard, 15,000 Birds Die in Oil Slick, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 28,
1999.
135Post "Erika" Safety-Related Matters-Ports/Placesof Refuge, 74th Sess., Agenda Item 2, Maritime
Safety Committee Doc. MSC/74/2/3/Add.1, para. 1 (Jan. 22, 2001). The term "ports of refuge" was renamed 'places of refuge" by MSC during the seventy-fourth session in May 2001.
136The first opportunity was a meeting of the Subcommittee on Fire Protection, which met in January
2001. See Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 16, Sub-Committee on Fire
Protection Doc. FP 45/16, 1.3 - 1.5 (Feb. 2001).
137Post 'Erika" Safety-Related Matters-Ports/Placesof Refuge, supra note 135, para. 3.
138See discussion supra Part III.A.
139Designation by Coastal States of Places of Refuge for Vessels in Distress Where There is Risk of
Pollution, 74th Sess., Agenda Item 2, Maritime Safety Committee Doc. MSC 74/2/4, para. 11 (Feb. 11,
2001).
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Although Spain made these statements in the context of places of refuge for
a potential pollution incident, the rationale is quite similar to that used by
Australia in denying Tampa entry into port because of unwanted persons.
Another statement made by Spain in their paper that also could be used in
the context of Tampa was:
[t]aking into account that in Spain, as in most States with a
coastline, a large part of the population live[s] [sic] in coastal
towns, it would be hard to justify to public opinion, after
creating such a substantial rescue service at public expense, that
a vessel in distress should be allowed to enter its territorial
waters solely for the purpose of trying to save that vessel and/or
its cargo, i.e., protect the economic
interests to the detriment of
1 40
the general public interest.
The application of that sentiment in the context of the Tampa, is a
chilling prospect; however, the economic interests protected would be those
of the assisting vessel and its ability to conduct its trade without major
interruption. Should the weight of public opinion be against bringing
survivors ashore because of their status as illegal entrants, the potential to
create a disincentive for vessels to respond to those in need becomes
dangerously great. 141
Spain's proposed resolution to facilitate assistance to vessels in
distress was to have coastal states:
[i]n the waters over which they exercise sovereignty or
jurisdiction, to the extent possible, identify places of refuge
specially selected for their favorable weather conditions,
distance from populated areas and absence of fishing or tourist
resources, for the purpose of the rescue
of the persons on board
142
and salvage of the ship and/or cargo.
However, the concept of pre-designated places of refuge was not
embraced by the IMO. 143 Instead, the MSC decided that any guidance
:40

Id., para. 10.2.

141 See generally Davies, supra note 40 (discussing commercial disincentives for ship masters to

effect rescues).
142 Id., para 12.1.
143 Countries opposed to the concept of pre-designated places of refuge included the United States,
who stated that pre-designation led to two significant problems: the first the "not in my backyard
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coming from the IMO would be non-mandatory, and would focus on the
coordination aspects of determining a place of refuge for vessels in need of
assistance or in distress. 144 The MSC designated the Subcommittee on the
Safety of Navigation ("NAV") as the coordinating body for the development
of the guidelines. The terms of reference developed by NAV concerned:
actions a master of a ship should take when in need of a
.1
place of refuge (including actions on board and actions required
in seeking assistance from other ships in the vicinity, salvage
operators, the flag State and coastal States).
.2
the evaluation of risks associated with the provision of
places of refuge and relevant operations in both a general and
case by case basis; and
.3
actions expected of coastal States for the identification,
together with
designation and provision
45 of such suitable places
any relevant facilities. 1
In July 2001, the NAV developed an outline of these guidelines.
Topics addressed included, inter alia, appraisal of the situation and
assessment of risks by both the ship and the coastal state including
environmental and social factors, identification of required actions,
establishment of responsibilities, and communications with all parties
involved. 146 As the NAV continued its work at its forty-eighth session in
July 2002, these concepts were broadened to include direction on topics
such as guidance for masters for contacting authorities of coastal states and

syndrome," and the second, that a "cookie cutter approach" to pre-designation, when each incident was
better handled on a case-by-case basis. U.S. Negotiating Position Paperfor the IMO for Maritime Safety
Committee, 74th Sess., Agenda Item 2 & 11 (May 2002) (on file at the Office of Maritime and International
Law, U.S Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter MSC 74 Position Paper]. Although
ultimately not accepted, Spain did receive some support for its concept. See e.g., Designation by Coastal
States of Places of Refuge for Vessels in Distress where there is a Risk of Pollution, 74th Sess., Agenda 2,
Maritime Safety Committee Doe. MSC 74/2/7 (submitted by Germany, Apr. 6, 2001) (supporting the views
by Spain and providing criteria for pre-designation of places of refuge).
144Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-Fourth Session, 74th Sess., Agenda Item
24, Maritime Safety Committee Doc. MSC 74/24, para. 2.15-2.32 (June 13, 2001).
14' Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 13, Sub-Committee on Safety
of Navigation Doc. NAV 47/13, Annex 18 (July 26, 2001).
14 Id., Annex 19.
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the decision-making process for designating a place of refuge. 147 The
United States noted that many of these considerations could also be used in
the resolution of Tampa-like persons rescued at sea.1 48

The key

contribution of the IMO's response to the Castor incident is the possibility
of creating a similar coordination mechanism for cases such as the Tampa.
That link should continue to be utilized.
V.

AN OBLIGATION TO COORDINATE?

As the IMO experience in response to both the Tampa and Castor
cases demonstrated, any attempt to create an absolute right in the master to
enter port to disembark persons receiving assistance at sea, or to create an
absolute obligation for coastal states to accept such persons is unlikely to
attract the level of consensus needed for the IMO to take any effective
action. Since the consensus approach dominates the IMO landscape,
49 and
votes are rare, an acceptable solution palatable to all must be devised.

147Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 19, Sub-Committee on Safety
of Navigation Doc. NAV 49/19, Annex 12 (Aug. 5, 2002).
148 MSC 74 Position Paper, supra note 143.
149See A.O. Adede, Amendment Proceduresfor Conventions with Technical Annexes: The IMCO
Experience, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 201 (1977). Consensus is particularly important in the IMO context because
most IMO treaties, including the Annexes to the SOLAS Convention and, with exceptions described below,
the Annex to the SAR Convention operate under the procedure of tacit amendment. The IMO is primarily
a technical body. Thus most of the conventions administered by the IMO have detailed technical
specifications regarding the design, construction, operation and equipping of ships. In order to keep up
with changing technology, the technical aspects of the instruments must be able to be amended fairly
quickly. To achieve this result, the IMO has incorporated the "tacit acceptance" procedure for amending
most of its technical Conventions. Both SOLAS and the SAR Convention allow for a tacit amendment
procedure, whereby once an amendment has been adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee or by an
IMO conference, the amendment automatically enters into force for all parties without a further act of
ratification or acceptance being required, unless more than one-third of the parties for the SAR Convention
and one-third of the parties representing fifty percent of the world's tonnage for SOLAS specifically object.
To get an amendment to the SOLAS or SAR Conventions approved by the Maritime Safety Committee,
and to ensure that, after approval, objections are not filed, consensus must be reached before adoption of
the amendments.
The tacit amendment procedure applies to the provisions of SOLAS regarding coastal states and the
shipmaster's international duty to render assistance to those in distress at sea, indeed both these regulations
were the subject of a tacit amendment procedure in 2000, entering into effect this July 2002. Adoption of
Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended, IMO
Maritime Safety Committee Res. MSC .99(73) (adopted Dec. 5, 2000). However, the provision of the
annex to the SAR Convention that requires parties to ensure that assistance be provided to any person in
distress at sea, regardless of the nationality or status of the person or the circumstances in which they are
found, section 2.1.10, is specifically not subject to tacit amendment procedure. In order to change that
section, two-thirds of the parties must specifically ratify the amendment, a much more cumbersome and
potentially time-consuming procedure. Importantly, though, the definition of "rescue" in the annex to the
SAR Convention, section 1.3.2, which is defined as "an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for
their initial medical or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety," is subject to tacit amendment.
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The desire to find a consensus solution brought many of the countries
interested in the issue to the informal meeting hosted by Sweden in
September 2002.150 The meeting was first suggested at the seventy-fifth
session of the MSC as a way to make progress.15 Those in attendance
agreed that the ultimate goals of the IMO review process mandated by
Resolution A.920(22) should be:
1. to save the lives of persons in distress at sea;
2. to ensure a situation in which the master of a ship continues
to readily come to the assistance of persons in distress;
3. to ensure the least inconvenience/delay to assisting ships;152
4. to ensure the integrity of the [search and rescue] system.
The informal group noted the important difference between the duty
to assist and the obligation to rescue, and considered the use of the shoreside focal points discussed in the context of places of refuge, as a means for
establishing communications between ship and shore to determine
procedures after persons rescued have been taken out of danger.' 53 The
consensus of the group was that "all operations and procedures (such as
screening and status assessment of rescued persons), which go beyond the
actual distress assistance and rescue of persons situations, should be
undertaken after the
persons embarked at sea had been taken off the assisting
154
[merchant] ship."'
In sum, it was the view of the informal group that the more quickly a
merchant vessel master could have those assisted removed from the ship for
further screening, status assessment, delivery ashore, etc., the less burden
would be placed on masters, and the more likely the integrity of the duty to
render assistance and the search and rescue system as a whole could be
maintained.
To implement this concept, the informal group has proposed a twopart solution to the IMO. First, amendment of the SOLAS Convention (and
150

The meeting was held in Noorkoping, Sweden, September 2-6, 2002. The following countries

were represented: Australia, France, Germany, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Observers from the IMO, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the
International Chamber of Shipping, and the International Federation of Sailing Masters Associations also
attended. See Outcome of Informal Meeting on "Safety Measures and Proceduresfor the Treatment of
Persons Rescued at Sea, " supra note 99, para 1.2.
'5' MSC 75/24, supra note 114, para. 1.8.
152 Id., para. 2.1.
53 Id., paras. 2.3 - 2.5.
5s4Id., para. 3.3.
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possibly the SAR Convention) is needed to place an obligation on Parties to
relieve masters of their burden as quickly

as possible,

w-ith a further

obligation to coordinate so that such relief is effected. The proposed change
to the SOLAS Convention reads:
[p]arties shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that Masters
of ships providing assistance by embarking onboard persons in
distress at sea are released from their obligations with minimum
further deviation from the ships' intended voyage, provided that
releasing the Master of the ship does not further endanger the
safety of life at sea. The Party responsible for the search and
rescue region in which such assistance is rendered shall
exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-ordination
occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from the
assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety, taking into
account the particular circumstances of the case. In these cases
to be
the relevant Parties shall arrange for such 1disembarkation
55
effected as soon as reasonably practicable.
The group noted that the proposed text "went a long way to reassure a
master that he would be able to disembark persons retrieved from distress at
sea at the earliest opportunity." 156 But more than reassurance, the obligation
to coordinate, with specific responsibilities given to a specific coastal state
(that in whose search and rescue region the incident occurs) will be the
linchpin in any mechanism by which future Tampa-like incidents can be
avoided.15 7 To accomplish the necessary coordination, standardized
procedures must be developed so that masters and coastal and flag states will
know what to expect and what is expected of them. In that respect, although
the informal group was unwilling to take the similarity too far, the work on
places of refuge could be emulated to develop such procedures.15 8 However,
the topics for guidance described supra Part IV.B., for places of refuge, such
as social factors, identification of required actions, and establishment of
responsibilities and communications with all parties involved are equally

"' Id., Annex 1, pp. 2.

:56 Id, para. 3.11.
17Of course, in the Tampa situation itself itis disputed in whose search and rescue zone the rescue
actualli occurred. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
Id., para. 4.2. The informal group also noted that the International Air and Maritime Search and
Rescue Manual might be the appropriate location for such procedures.
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applicable to the scenario of the treatment of persons rescued at sea.1

Although the group recognized that in most cases a "place of safety"
as defined in the SAR Convention would be located ashore, they also agreed
that it could be a properly equipped and staffed ship. This was a particularly
important point to the United States, a country which routinely embarks
migrants in distress at sea, provides shelter, food, and medical care, and then
returns them to their country of origin without landing the survivors in the
United States.' 60 As the group felt that creation of the new obligation on
coastal states to coordinate and cooperate would largely alleviate issues of
determining a place of safety, it was agreed that it was not necessary to
6
define
"place
in the SAR
Convention.
1 However, defining this
term may
helpof
to safety"
avoid confusion
in the
future.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The need for coastal, port, and flag states to cooperate and coordinate
is the key to resolving situations such as the Tampa and the Castor. The
creation of new, absolute rights will not foster that coordination and
cooperation, but an obligation to coordinate and cooperate might. Few, if
any, countries want merchant vessels to be left "holding the bag" in cases
where the master and crew have taken potentially heroic action to save lives
at sea. Further, the possibility that mariners could be left holding that bag
creates a financial disincentive against one of the oldest traditions of the
sea. 162 Hopefully, the IMO will recognize that coordination and cooperation
can resolve many Tampa-like cases, and it is recommended that the
Maritime Safety Committee embrace the outcomes developed in Sweden.

159While the topics and guidance may be the same, they might need to be addressed in separate
chapters of the most widely used field procedures manual on these subjects: INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
ORGANIZATION & INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, THE INTERNATIONAL AERONAUTICAL

AND MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE MANUAL, (1988).
160Id., para 3.4. See also Alien Migrant Interdiction, Overview, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/gopl/mle/AMIO.htm.
161 Id., para. 3.5.
162 David Cockroft, the General Secretary of the International Transport Workers' Federation, made a
particularly poignant statement in that regard: "That it has reportedly cost a responsible operator like
[Tampa] hundreds of thousands of dollars to do the right thing could send out a terrible signal, especially to
the shabbier and more cutthroat end of the market: 'humanity costs.' Will those bad operators now
pressure their crews to pass by and ignore ships in distress?" Richardson, supra note 38.

